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Abstract 
 
Topic area and paper objectives: 
This paper investigates the hypotheses that it is possible to build a practical access control system 
for patient records within a hospital domain that ensures access to all those who are at any one time 
part of a particular patient’s treating team yet at the same time provides appropriate barriers to 
access for those not currently part of this team.  A caveat for this hypothesis is that at no time 
should a clinician be barred from access to a particular record, but that means should exist to ensure 
that appropriate access is accepted and inappropriate access reported upon.  Central to this idea is 
that it should be possible to use standards of professional ethics and normal workflow to enable the 
model. 
 
Background and concise literature review: 
Traditional models of access control do not cope well with the problem of how to define access 
permissions for a team that is dynamic in nature (as is a treating team) and where the access is to 
objects (patient records) only in the loosest sense ‘owned’ by those who have a need to access such 
objects.  In these models either the system administrator has to define permitted access in advance 
(mandatory access control) or the owner of the data can define the permitted accesses (discretionary 
access control) (Pfleeger 2000).   Extensions to Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and Team 
Based Access Control (TMAC) have provided the most useful solutions to date but still require a 
system administrator or surrogate to define appropriate access in advance. (Ferraiolo & Kuhn 1992) 
(Ramaswamy & Sandhu 1998) (NIST 2004) (Thomas 1997) (Georgiadis et al 2001) (Georgiadis 
2002)  However, work by Thomas & Sandhu (1997) and Alotaiby & Chen (2004) has shown that it 
is possible to incorporate changes to access privileges as part of normal workflow.   
 
Methods: 
As a result of observing and discussing normal and unusual workflow patterns within the 
Tasmanian hospital environment a set of scenarios were developed each of which characterised a 
unique instance of change to whom should be able to access a patient record.  The method used by 
current access control models to handle each scenario was then analysed.   A new definition of a 
team in a hospital environment was then used to develop the Professional Access control (PAC) 
model that was implemented and tested in Oracle.  Testing was carried out using each scenario in a 
simulated hospital of 3 wards, 20 staff and 20 patients. 
 
Results and discussions: 
Clinicians at a hospital were defined as either being Members: part of a patient’s treating team, 
Colleagues: having the same role and belonging to the same unit as the patient or Associates: part of 
the hospital but not currently related to the patient.  Being a team Member can be adjusted as part of 
the normal hospital admission and referral processes.  Emergency access is provided subject to 
retrospective approval and auditing procedures.  The model has been developed as an Oracle 
implementation for a simulated hospital environment and tested against the 24 scenarios defined. 
The Professional Access Control model allows for dynamic definition of the treating team and 
facilitates guaranteed availability to clinicians appropriate to their relationship to a patient.  This is 
made possible by relying upon the professional ethics of clinicians rather than those of system 
administrators. It relieves the burden of predefining access control from system administrators 
without endowing clinicians with unnecessary system administration privileges. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is simple to state that the ‘treating team’ should have access to the records for a particular patient, 
but it has been hard to demonstrate that there is practical way to build computer systems to enforce 
this principle whilst at the same time ensuring that any legitimate access request is always granted, 
even in an emergency.  Central to the difficulty is the fact that the definition of a treating team is 
fluid and can change in a manner that cannot be predicted in advance.  This means that solutions 
have placed unrealistic requirements on system administrators as they attempt to predict what 
should be the authorised access patterns.  This paper describes a solution that lifts the burden of 
defining the current treating team from the system administrator, instead capturing the changing 
access permissions as part of current workflow enabled by trust in the professional ethics of 
clinicians. 
 
Computer security is much more than just a technical IT access problem.  The largest security 
weaknesses in IT systems are often the people in the system (Schneier 2000, p.255).  With paper 
records it has been traditional for hospital administrators and health professionals to guard access 
to patient records.  The patient record is generally left with the patient in the hospital and any 
access to it is normally in view of the patient or other staff members.  In contrast, with computer 
systems, it has been traditional for the system administrator to have control over who accesses 
which records.  The emergence of digital health records therefore creates a “professional control” 
issue.  Who should manage access to digital health records – the system administrator, the health 
professionals, or both? 
 
The vast majority of Health professionals pride themselves on their ethical practice.  Being a 
professional entails conformity to regulations, professional codes of behaviour, and relevant 
organisational policies.  Breaches of these standards can result in severe personal repercussions.  
The very reason why it is uncommon for system administrators to be corrupt is because they are 
professionals and there are consequences if they are found wanting.  There is no reason why health 
professionals should behave more irresponsibly given that they are informed of their 
responsibilities and that the system supports appropriate security policies. 
 
The ideal access control model for the hospital environment would, it is suggested, give health 
professionals 100% guaranteed access to all relevant records while maximising confidentiality and 
integrity safeguards.  This all needs to be done in a fashion that minimises implementation and 
running costs, and maximises system usability.  Efficiency is maximised if the users can authorise 
each other to perform accesses, without the need to directly involve system administrators.  This, in 
most aspects, reflects how the paper-based record system operates.  System administrators should 
be left to do the high level tasks rather than being dragged onto the wards to do the patient-user and 
user-user authorisation tasks. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The project consisted of seven stages: Workflow Analysis, Model Analysis, Team Definition, 
Model Development, Model Implementation, Functional Testing, and Scenario Verification. 
 
Workflow Analysis was performed by interviewing health practitioners, administrators and IT 
managers.  The purpose was to describe as many relevant and distinct hospital system requirements 
(in the form of scenarios) as practicable.  Model Analysis involved researching related work in 
access control techniques and models.  The purpose was to extract useful concepts from existing 
models that could be incorporated into a new model.  A team-based access control model requires 
the team concept to be defined.  The scenarios produced by the workflow analysis and the team-
based examples researched in the model analysis were analysed qualitatively to produce a suitable 
Team Definition for the hospital domain. 
 
In the light of the information gleaned from the first three stages, the Model Development stage 
involved the definition a new access control model.  The model had to meet the requirements of the 
Workflow Analysis and incorporate the useful features of existing models in a way that facilitated 
the team type defined in the third stage.  The Model Implementation was done using Oracle, 
primarily because it was already in use in the Tasmanian Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) controlled public hospitals. 
 
Functional Testing of the implementation was performed using a software simulation of a hospital 
with 3 wards, 20 patients and 20 staff.  This was necessary as it was impractical to pursue a clinical 
implementation before demonstrating the potential of the new model.  The purpose of the functional 
testing was to ensure that the implementation possessed the functionality required and that correct 
authorisations were always maintained.  Scenario Verification was performed as a double check to 
verify that the functionality required by the scenarios generated in the Workflow Analysis was 
indeed achieved. This meant checking the functionality requirements of each scenario individually. 
 
3. Results 
 
Workflow Analysis 
 
The Workflow Analysis yielded a total of 24 scenarios.  These scenarios were divided into five 
categories:  Patient Issues, Staff Change Issues, Staff Information Issues, Administrative Issues, 
and Security Incidents. 
 
Model Analysis 
 
In order to find a model suitable for the volatile hospital environment, many existing access control 
models were investigated.  The most significant of these included Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC), TeaM-based Access Control (TMAC), Task-Based Access Control (TBAC), Organisation 
Based Access Control (ORBAC), Provision-Based Access Control (PBAC), and the Clark-Wilson 
Model.  Auditing and middleware solutions were also investigated. 
 
Middleware (Woodcock & Gillies 2003) (Hartnett 2002) and ORBAC (Kalam et al. 2003) were too 
complex for the envisaged solution.  TBAC (Thomas 1997) and TMAC (Alotaiby & Chen 2004) 
showed that it was possible to use normal workflow operations to trigger access control functions.  
The solution can use this principle to allow behind-the-scenes access control. 
 
Both RBAC (Ferraiolo & Kuhn 1992) (Ramaswamy & Sandhu 1998) (NIST 2004) and TMAC 
(Thomas 1997) (Georgiadis et al. 2001) (Georgiadis et al. 2002) are based on Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC).  They therefore fundamentally require that privileges be specified by systems 
administrators in advance.  In order to facilitate some predictable emergency access requirements 
they tend to either specify privileges which are too broad, or enable users to take on granting 
privileges which are designed for use by system administrators.  Such user grants, it can be argued, 
are inconsistent with the definition of roles as well as dangerous from a security point of view. 
 
The solution needs to overcome these RBAC/TMAC/MAC limitations by giving appropriate 
responsibilities to users in professional environments and by employing retrospective access control 
techniques similar to those proposed in PBAC (Kudo 2002).  It can benefit by using a more fine-
grained approach to team definition than that employed by TMAC.  The solution must guarantee 
availability, while maximising confidentiality and integrity protection through improved granularity 
of control.  Reporting procedures can allow peer-review and auditing procedures to play a part in 
access control, making access control more than just a technical issue.  
 
Team Definition 
 
The three main features of the Professional Access Control (PAC) Model’s team concept are that: 
1. Each patient has their own personal team; 
2. There are no team specific roles – roles are organisation wide; and 
3. Each team is supported by two layers of backup personnel. 
 
The one-to-many patient-team relation offers the most fine-grained solution and is superior to the 
many-to-many relations used in other team-based models.  PAC teams are initialised automatically 
as part of the process of admitting a patient to a ward.  This is achieved by having a default team for 
each ward.  Default teams are defined by specifying a default role set for each ward.  Each default 
team is then generated by automatically placing all staff members with the specified default roles 
who are able to work on the ward, on the patient’s team. 
 
The second point relates to staff roles.  PAC uses the same concept of roles as RBAC.  This means 
that staff can have multiple roles and generally more than one staff member has a particular role.  
PAC also uses a location context constraint called a unit.  Each staff member has what is called a 
unit set, which is the group of units on which the staff member is currently allocated to work. 
 
The unique feature of the PAC team concept is outlined by the third point.  Once a team is defined 
for a patient, there by definition exist two further groups of staff which may be called upon to care 
for the patient.  These further groups are defined by the relationship they have with the members on 
the patient’s team.  Figure 1 shows the team group and the two supporting staff groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  PAC Team Staff Categories 
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Staff members on the team are defined as members.  Staff members who share a role with any of the 
team members and are allocated to work on the patient’s unit are defined as colleagues.  The 
remaining staff members, those who are neither members nor colleagues, are defined as associates.  
From a particular nurse’s point of view, they may be a member of 6 patient teams; a colleague of 20 
other patient teams; and an associate of 200 further teams. 
 
PAC defines these three staff categories in order to allow different access control procedures to be 
used, depending on the closeness of a staff member to the patient in question.  Access needs to be 
controlled on a need-to-know basis. Team members have the greatest need for access; colleagues 
may need access to help members in the normal course of work; and associates should only need 
access in exceptional circumstances.  Access control should therefore be tight for associates, 
moderate for colleagues, and easy for members. 
 
This team model allows PAC to be extremely flexible.  It can easily cater for situations where the 
team structure varies from ward to ward in a hospital, or even for different supervisors using 
different approaches on the same ward, or different approaches to be taken on a per patient basis!  A 
supervisor can make everyone on the ward a member of all patient teams, in one extreme.  
Conversely, at the other extreme, they can restrict access down to having only one carer for a 
patient.  The approach used for a patient can be changed at any time.  This flexibility is in stark 
contrast to the team structures used in TMAC models, and makes PAC-based systems highly 
usable. 
 
Model Development 
 
Professional Access Control (PAC) is a high level team-based access control model which 
incorporates Trusted Access Control (TAC) (de la Motte & Hartnett 2005), RBAC and PBAC.  It is 
designed to be used in domains such as hospitals where the users are professionals and have a 
clearly defined duty of care to the information owners (their patients).  The priorities of the model 
are to guarantee availability and to minimise administrative overheads. 
 
Figure 2 shows the main concepts of the model.  The objects in the diagram represent the collection 
of one or more objects owned by the owner.  In the hospital domain the objects would represent 
different parts of the patient’s record.  Members on the patient’s team can directly access the record 
of the patient. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  PAC Access Control Mechanisms 
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PAC incorporates TAC, RBAC and PBAC.  TAC is the method used to add additional members to 
the team.  Under TAC, any team member can add another user to the team.  This is akin to a patient 
referral and is done without the need to involve the system administrator.  RBAC roles are used in 
connection with a location context constraint to automatically initialise team membership on patient 
admission, as well as to determine the colleague user status.  RBAC is also used to determine which 
parts of the patient’s record is available to the accessing user.  RBAC restrictions can be overridden 
in emergencies.  PBAC is used to provide a reporting mechanism to deal with accesses by 
colleagues and associates.  Accesses by colleagues are reported back to the team member(s), while 
accesses by associates are reported back to the system administrator. 
 
The mechanism for adding users to the team is very simple.  The vast majority of accesses are 
therefore made by team members.  Accesses by colleagues and associates are in the minority.  The 
reporting mechanism can be made to fit in with normal communications processes and therefore 
does not add any significant administrative burden.  The system administrator has only a secondary 
access control role, that of monitoring accesses and merely checking a few of the more unusual 
accesses.  The administrative burden on the system administrator is therefore reduced. 
 
Model Implementation 
 
The result of implementing the PAC model in Oracle was the Oracle PAC Toolkit.  The toolkit is 
made up of two components – a set of database tables and a set of PL/SQL procedures and 
functions.  All the PAC functionality is provided in top level PL/SQL procedures, while the data 
necessary for access control is stored in the database tables.  While system administrators may 
choose to manipulate the tables directly, or through the Oracle Enterprise Manager, applications 
which use the toolkit only need to access the top level procedures.  The tables are thus protected 
from applications and their users by Clark-Wilson style well-formed transactions. 
 
Functional Testing 
 
The functionality of the PAC implementation was tested by ensuring the procedural calls initiated 
the correct sequences of functional calls.  A simulation was set up in the Oracle database of a 
hospital with wards, administrators, health practitioners and patients.  The procedures were tested 
to ensure that the security state of the hospital remained valid.  The results yielded no errors and 
showed that the desired functionality was being achieved. 
 
Scenario Verification 
 
It was shown that the model was able to meet the requirements of the 24 scenarios established in 
the Workflow Analysis stage. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Much research has been done into developing access control systems for health related 
environments.  Even after all this work, no clear system has emerged that meets the requirements in 
an efficient way.  Many sophisticated and clever solutions have been developed, and while many of 
them have shown promise, there has been a tendency to reject them on the basis that they are either 
too inflexible or hard to implement.  The aim of this project was to try to find a simple, low-impact 
solution to the access control problem which can be incorporated into hospitals. 
 
PAC provides a workable solution that guarantees the availability of records to clinicians and 
therefore ensures they are never denied access to information necessary for clinical decision 
making.  It achieves this without introducing any additional work for users, by allowing workflow 
applications to trigger access control responses.  The solution provides a system which can easily 
be implemented and that gives access to users on a need-to-know basis.  The fine granularity of 
control increases confidentiality and integrity protections over existing solutions.  PAC is very 
flexible, facilitating the formation of ad hoc treatment teams in a user friendly fashion. 
 
PAC also reduces the burdens on the systems administrator and gives the appropriate level of 
responsibility to the clinical professionals who are most aware of the matters of patient 
confidentiality.  It recognises the highly ethical environment in hospitals and adopts a peer-review 
process which is appropriate for the management of professionals.  The flexible solution achieved 
by PAC is in stark contrast to the purely technical solutions that are currently on offer. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Initial studies into the health and hospital domains highlighted that for a system to be usable, access 
control mechanisms must guarantee the availability of patient information to practitioners.  It was 
found that there were no existing access control models which could suitably guarantee availability 
in a volatile environment. 
 
It was argued that in highly ethical environments, where there are adequate professional incentives 
to induce proper behaviour, there is fundamentally no reason why informed users should have a 
direct role in access control.  In view of this, a new high level access control model, named 
Professional Access Control (PAC) has been proposed. 
 
This paper proposes the Professional Access Control (PAC) Model.  PAC is a user-controlled 
model which applies fundamental and proven techniques from existing access control models.  It 
provides a flexible team concept which gives team members direct access to a patient’s records, 
while allowing non-members to gain access through an efficient monitoring process. PAC provides 
primary control to the health practitioners, thus alleviating their dependence on system 
administrators to solve their access problems.  As such it takes a great load off the system 
administrators, leaving them free to concentrate on other activities. 
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